or S. 270, the Texas low-level radioactive waste bill, and any other legislative or executive business cleared for Senate action. Therefore, Members can anticipate rollcall votes throughout Wednesday's session of the Senate.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order, upon the completion of the remarks of Senator HARKIN.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I am advised the Senator is on his way. I will suggest the absence of a quorum, but at the conclusion of Senator HARKIN's remarks it already stands that we will adjourn under the previous order; is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. The Senate will be in adjournment at that time.

Mr. HELMS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

NATO EXPANSION

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I would like to speak just for a few minutes about the issue of the NATO expansion that has come to the floor today. As I understand the parliamentary situation, the NATO expansion resolution has been laid down, we are now in morning business, and we will not be back on the NATO expansion resolution until sometime later—not tomorrow—maybe later this week or maybe next week or beyond.

I am hopeful at the outset that even though the bill has been laid down, the Senate will be given time for due discussion and debate on the proposed NATO expansion. Quite frankly, I was one of those who signed a letter with my colleague Senator SMITH from New Hampshire and, if I am not mistaken, 17 other Senators, both Republicans and Democrats, asking that the debate on the proposed NATO expansion be suspended or postponed for a while. I will get into the reasons for that in just a moment. I am sorry it is now before the Senate. I think it should have been postponed for very good and sufficient reasons.

This is an issue with profound implications for our Nation and the international community. It is also an issue that, I am disappointed to say, has not received the kind of vigorous national debate that it deserves. I was asked the other day when I was in my home State of Iowa about the NATO expan-

sion bill and what kind of interest was in it. I said basically it is a big yawn. No one is talking about it, very few people are writing about it, and yet this may be the most serious vote that we take this year in the U.S. Senate.

Quite frankly, even though I respect the Foreign Relations Committee, they have had a lot of hearings on it I know, they have had witnesses in, but still it has not received the kind of national debate and national focus that it really deserves. I think we are kind of rushing this issue right now in light of the fact that there is supposed to be a NATO study that is due this June. Again, I will talk about that in a moment.

Taking such a huge step in foreign policy with such low levels of awareness among the public and even in Congress is not a good idea. The debate or, more accurately, I should say the lack of debate on this important policy question has concerned and surprised me. Moving forward before legitimate concerns and competing viewpoints receive a complete airing does not seem prudent. The usually deliberative Senate seems to be in a rush to pass judgment on this issue. I ask, what's the rush?

Concerns about the extension of America's military obligations have been voiced by Members, interest groups and academics across the political spectrum. One must observe more than just casually that when the voices expressing caution include progressives, conservatives, libertarians and others, Republicans and Democrats, such diverse opposition may be a sign to act more slowly and deliberatively on this issue.

Let me be clear, I have not yet decided how I will vote on NATO expansion. If I had to vote tomorrow, I would vote no, because I believe, more often than not, that is the safest way to proceed when one does not have all the information that one needs and when there are, I think, sufficient questions about the expansion and what it is going to cost and what its implications for our foreign policy will be. However, later on, after more information is gleaned in a vigorous public debate, I might be inclined to vote for it. But at the present time, I cannot support it without more information and without some more enlightenment as to the actual cost figures.

Without a comprehensive consideration of the issues surrounding NATO expansion, I am concerned that we will continually have to revisit potentially divisive issues, such as cost and burdensharing among member nations, the issues of command and coordination of forces, issues of responses to real and perceived threats, or even the more basic question of the mission and scope of the organization itself. These are not simple questions that lend themselves to a sound-bite debate. These are questions which will shape, for better or for worse, our defense and foreign policy options for decades to

To be sure, NATO has been a success. It has helped keep the peace in Europe for nearly 50 years both by deterring aggression from the Warsaw Pact nations and encouraging cooperation between NATO members. I must say that due to the commitment of its members and the leadership of the United States, NATO has largely fulfilled the reason for its very birth-the Soviet Union. NATO has fulfilled its original intent, it has outlived the Soviet Union, and now we have to ask, what is its future? What role would an expanded NATO play in a post-cold-war era? What role would it play in a new century, in a new millennium? And the question I will be raising tonight and many times during this debate is, at what cost, both in financial terms and in less tangible areas such as the potential for strained relations with nonmember nations or even a dangerous rollback of the nuclear nonproliferation progress made since the end of the cold war?

One of my primary concerns, as I said, is the wide variance in and suspect reliability of projected financial costs. I have seen projections range from \$125 billion down to \$1.5 billion. When you have that kind of wide variance, something is very strange.

Another piece of the puzzle we are missing is how new members are to address their military shortfalls. Although the shortfalls were to be identified in December 1997, the countries' force goals will not be set until this spring. In other words, we are without a plan to address the force goals and the price tag associated with it. I am very uncomfortable signing the American taxpayer's name to a potentially ballooning blank check.

What share the taxpayers ultimately will pay for NATO expansion is not at all clear, not just because there is no consensus on what the overall costs will be, but also because burdensharing arrangements between current and prospective members have not been firmly established.

I will offer an amendment at the beginning to deal with some of the cost concerns I have been raising. As we know, the \$1.5 billion cost figure that we have seen for the United States for NATO expansion is quoted widely and broadly. That figure includes only what is known as common costs. The figure excludes a number of other expansion costs for the three nations that are due to join NATO if this resolution passes relating to the upgrading of their militaries. The United States is expected to contribute substantially to the "national" costs through bilateral subsidies my amendment would require, including the bilateral contributions, when calculating the U.S. share of enlargement costs.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of my amendment be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the text of the amendment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: